Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt) vs War in Afghanistan (2001-2021)

Qing forces transitioned flexibly between classical siege warfare and irregular operations; Hui rebels, locked in static fortress defense, demonstrated no doctrinal flexibility.

The Coalition applied COIN (counter-insurgency) doctrine late and incompletely; the Taliban, on the other hand, demonstrated superior performance in asymmetric adaptation by flexibly transitioning between classical guerrilla warfare, political lobbying, and the diplomatic table.

War of Annihilation — Zuo Zongtang's doctrine of 'first cleanse Shaanxi, then besiege Gansu, finally reconquer Xinjiang' constituted a systematic elimination campaign aimed at the physical destruction of Hui military presence.

Attrition War — The Taliban used time as a weapon to exhaust the political will of a superpower.

The Qing side correctly identified the center of gravity of the Hui revolt: the Jinjibao fortress and Ma Hualong's charismatic leadership. The destruction of this center unraveled the entire insurgent network.

The Coalition defined its Schwerpunkt as Taliban leadership on the battlefield, while the Taliban's true center of gravity was the legitimacy support of the Afghan population; this targeting error is the root cause of strategic defeat.

Zuo created fragmentation within rebel ranks through amnesty offers; some Hui leaders betrayed their comrades, contributing to the success of deception operations.

The Taliban achieved superiority in deception through false surrenders, civilian-dressed fighters, and hidden headquarters in Pakistani safe zones; the Coalition, over-relying on technical intelligence, diagnosed these deceptions late.

Zuo Zongtang's Krupp artillery systematically demolished rebel fortress walls, generating both physical and psychological shock; firepower synchronized with maneuver delivered decisive results.

The Coalition's B-52, AC-130, and Hellfire UAV strikes created tactical shock; however, the Taliban's IED warfare and suicide attacks reversed shock superiority at the strategic level.

The rugged topography of the Loess Plateau and the harsh northwestern winters initially favored the rebels, but Zuo's seasonal campaign planning gradually neutralized this natural shield.

The Hindu Kush mountains, the Tora Bora cave systems, and harsh winter conditions became natural allies of the Taliban; the Coalition's mechanized and air assets lost their effectiveness in this geography.

Qing forces detected rebel movements in advance through regional Han militia networks, while Hui leaders belatedly recognized Qing force concentrations and lost initiative.

While the Taliban knew the local population, terrain, and Coalition routines, the Coalition could not fully grasp Afghan social structure, Pashtun tribal codes, or the true force structure of the Taliban.

Qing forces deliberately advanced slowly, consolidating each region before moving to the next; this 'stone upon stone' approach incrementally negated rebel maneuver advantages.

The Coalition achieved rapid deployment through strategic airlift capability; however, the Taliban's high-tempo hit-and-run maneuvers in small cells asymmetrically reversed the interior lines advantage.

Hui religious fervor was initially high, but the fall of Jinjibao and execution of Ma Hualong triggered moral collapse; on the Qing side, the restoration of dynastic authority provided high motivation.

Against the eroding morale and mission ambiguity of Coalition troops over time, the Taliban's religious-ideological motivation and 'expelling the foreign occupier' narrative activated Clausewitz's concept of friction against the Coalition.

Zuo Zongtang dissolved the rebel front from within by promising amnesty and resettlement to surrendering Hui communities, achieving battlefield-free gains through psychological warfare.

After the 2020 Doha Agreement, the Taliban dissolved Afghan National Army commanders through bribery and tribal ties, effectively seizing Kabul without fighting in August 2021; this is a pure Sun Tzu victory.