War in Afghanistan (2001-2021) vs Spanish–American War

The Coalition applied COIN (counter-insurgency) doctrine late and incompletely; the Taliban, on the other hand, demonstrated superior performance in asymmetric adaptation by flexibly transitioning between classical guerrilla warfare, political lobbying, and the diplomatic table.

The U.S. flexibly applied joint land-sea operational doctrine, while Spain remained fixed in static fortress defense and could not transition to dynamic maneuver.

Attrition War — The Taliban used time as a weapon to exhaust the political will of a superpower.

War of Annihilation — The U.S. broke colonial will by totally destroying the Spanish fleets at Manila and Santiago.

The Coalition defined its Schwerpunkt as Taliban leadership on the battlefield, while the Taliban's true center of gravity was the legitimacy support of the Afghan population; this targeting error is the root cause of strategic defeat.

The U.S. correctly identified the destruction of Spanish fleets as the center of gravity, automatically resolving land operations. Spain failed to determine its Schwerpunkt and resorted to fragmented defense.

The Taliban achieved superiority in deception through false surrenders, civilian-dressed fighters, and hidden headquarters in Pakistani safe zones; the Coalition, over-relying on technical intelligence, diagnosed these deceptions late.

Dewey's nighttime infiltration of Manila Bay was a classic surprise maneuver; Spanish coastal batteries were destroyed before they could go on alert.

The Coalition's B-52, AC-130, and Hellfire UAV strikes created tactical shock; however, the Taliban's IED warfare and suicide attacks reversed shock superiority at the strategic level.

At Manila Bay, Dewey's rapid-fire artillery annihilated the Spanish fleet within hours, demonstrating absolute fire superiority.

The Hindu Kush mountains, the Tora Bora cave systems, and harsh winter conditions became natural allies of the Taliban; the Coalition's mechanized and air assets lost their effectiveness in this geography.

Caribbean summer storm season and tropical disease wore down both sides; however, the U.S. minimized climatic friction through geographic proximity advantage.

While the Taliban knew the local population, terrain, and Coalition routines, the Coalition could not fully grasp Afghan social structure, Pashtun tribal codes, or the true force structure of the Taliban.

U.S. naval attachés had mapped the Spanish fleet inventory years in advance, while Spain remained unaware of the U.S. Pacific operational plan.

The Coalition achieved rapid deployment through strategic airlift capability; however, the Taliban's high-tempo hit-and-run maneuvers in small cells asymmetrically reversed the interior lines advantage.

The U.S. Navy demonstrated strategic mobility between two oceans, executing Dewey's rapid transit from Hong Kong to Manila; Spain failed to leverage interior lines.

Against the eroding morale and mission ambiguity of Coalition troops over time, the Taliban's religious-ideological motivation and 'expelling the foreign occupier' narrative activated Clausewitz's concept of friction against the Coalition.

American public entered the war with high motivation fueled by yellow journalism, while the Spanish military was crushed under the psychological weight of the 'honorable defeat' doctrine.

After the 2020 Doha Agreement, the Taliban dissolved Afghan National Army commanders through bribery and tribal ties, effectively seizing Kabul without fighting in August 2021; this is a pure Sun Tzu victory.

The U.S. exploited Spanish attrition in Cuba and diplomatic isolation pre-war, pushing Madrid into defensive posture; the Guam commander surrendered without even hearing of the war.