Battle of Megiddo vs Falklands War

The Egyptian army quickly spread onto the plain and changed formation immediately after exiting the narrow pass, then seamlessly transitioned to a siege doctrine. This flexibility demonstrates the command staff's ability to adapt instantly to changing operational circumstances. The Canaanite side failed to make any tactical changes and retreated behind walls, adopting a passive resistance.

Britain masterfully executed dynamic maneuver defense and offensive transition; the Royal Marines and Parachute Regiments adapted asymmetrically to terrain conditions. Argentina clung to static trench doctrine and the island command remained reactive at critical moments.

Siege/Challenge

Siege/Standoff Engagement — Annihilation of an isolated island garrison via naval and air blockade followed by amphibious assault; a classic overseas power projection operation for strategic position control.

Thutmose correctly identified the center of gravity (Schwerpunkt) and struck at the inert and weak linkage line between Megiddo city and the Canaanite army. In contrast, the Canaanite coalition relied on the static defense of Megiddo's walls, a decision that neutralized their own operational center of gravity.

Britain correctly identified the Schwerpunkt: the Argentine center of gravity was the Stanley garrison, and the full striking power of the amphibious force was concentrated on this target. Argentina failed to define its center of gravity and neutralized itself by dispersing forces across the island surface.

Knowing the Canaanites expected the two safer routes, Thutmose executed a perfect military deception by choosing the most dangerous, unexpected path. This allowed the enemy to be struck before forming a battle line. The successful passage without any intelligence leak indicates a high level of operational security.

The SAS Pebble Island raid and deception maneuvers prior to San Carlos confused Argentine intelligence. Argentine air reconnaissance was inadequate, so while expecting the British landing near Darwin, they were caught off guard at San Carlos.

The Egyptian army rapidly deployed its chariots on the plain, coordinating an archer and light infantry assault that broke the Canaanite lines. The dust cloud and noise generated by the chariot attacks created a collapse effect among Canaanite troops, breaking their resistance and turning it into a rout all the way to the walls of Megiddo.

British naval gunfire (4.5-inch) and Harrier close air support shattered Argentine defenses during the Mount Longdon and Tumbledown assaults. Argentina failed to coordinate firepower with maneuver; artillery usage remained reactive and dispersed.

The Aruna Mountain Pass was extremely risky terrain due to its narrowness and potential for ambush. Thutmose moved before seasonal rains could render it impassable. Additionally, upon exiting onto the plain, factors like sun position and wind direction are assessed to have enhanced Egyptian chariot maneuverability.

The harsh winter conditions of the South Atlantic strained both sides, but British troops adapted thanks to Arctic training. Argentine troops entered the cold unprepared; peat terrain and hill positions fell to British night assaults.

Through a spy network and prior reconnaissance, Egypt had detailed knowledge of the Aruna Pass condition and the terrain around Megiddo. Conversely, the Canaanite alliance, though aware of the approaching Egyptian army, failed to predict the chosen route and was completely surprised.

In Sun Tzu's 'know yourself and your enemy' principle, Britain held complete superiority; it knew Argentine force structure, morale, and logistics in detail. Argentina, in contrast, grossly underestimated British political resolve and military capacity.

Thutmose III's decision to lead his army single-file through the narrow Aruna Pass to surprise the enemy is a primitive yet highly effective example of interior lines maneuver. Egyptian forces were able to concentrate at a decisive point much faster than the Canaanite army waiting on exterior lines.

The British Command Staff established a rapid maneuver chain along the San Carlos-Goose Green-Mount Kent-Stanley axis after the landing and exploited interior lines. Argentine forces clustered around Stanley, fragmenting into exterior lines and unable to respond to British tactical movements.

Thutmose's scolding speech at the war council and his personal choice of the most dangerous route reinforced the army's 'god-king' image, creating fatal motivation. Clausewitzian 'friction' manifested on the Canaanite side as internal friction from command weakness and a waiting psychology, while on the Egyptian side as overconfidence generated by the surprise maneuver.

The British professional army moved with high unit cohesion and victory resolve; Thatcher's political resolve was the background driver. Argentine conscripts suffered morale collapse in winter conditions, and Clausewitz's concept of friction compounded exponentially within the Argentine ranks.

Thutmose's swift and resolute advance caused the Canaanite principalities to panic before they could fully unite. The enemy forces huddled inside Megiddo lost psychological superiority before the battle commenced and were unable to seek diplomatic resolution.

The United Kingdom drove Argentina into international isolation through UN and US diplomatic channels; Haig's mediation served British time-buying objectives. The Argentine Junta failed to fully read the diplomatic terrain and miscalculated within the Soviet-US dichotomy.