Comparative Analysis

November 2018 Gaza–Israel Clashes vs Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt)

Compare not just who won, but how it was won through the data: force balance, casualties, inventory, operational capacity, and military perspective...

November 2018 Gaza–Israel Clashes

11-13 Kasım 2018

Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt)

1862 - 1877

Summary

November 2018 Gaza–Israel Clashes

11-13 Kasım 2018

Battle Scale
General Operation
Winner
Hamas Military Wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Parties

Israel Defense Forces (IDF)

IsraelIsraeli

Hamas Military Wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Hamas / Palestinian Islamic JihadPalestinian

Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt)

1862 - 1877

Battle Scale
General Operation
Winner
Qing Dynasty Forces (Xiang and Hunan Armies)
Parties

Qing Dynasty Forces (Xiang and Hunan Armies)

Qing ChinaHan-Manchu

Hui Muslim Rebels and Allied Nian Forces

Hui Rebel ConfederationHui

Operational Capacity Matrix

November 2018 Gaza–Israel Clashes

Sustainability Logistics8154
Command & Control C27358
Time & Space Usage6271
Intelligence & Recon6763
Force Multipliers Morale/Tech7957

Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt)

Sustainability Logistics7334
Command & Control C27127
Time & Space Usage6856
Intelligence & Recon6441
Force Multipliers Morale/Tech7749

Force Projection

November 2018 Gaza–Israel Clashes

Israel Defense Forces (IDF)%63 -> %71+8%
%71
%44
Hamas Military Wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)%37 -> %44+7%

Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt)

Qing Dynasty Forces (Xiang and Hunan Armies)%58 -> %47-11%
%47
%8
Hui Muslim Rebels and Allied Nian Forces%42 -> %8-34%

Strategic Victory

November 2018 Gaza–Israel Clashes

Hamas Military Wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
%31
%58
Hamas Military Wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt)

Qing Dynasty Forces (Xiang and Hunan Armies)

Qing Dynasty Forces (Xiang and Hunan Armies)
%71
%6
Hui Muslim Rebels and Allied Nian Forces

Casualties & Attrition

Casualties & AttritionNovember 2018 Gaza–Israel ClashesIsrael Defense Forces (IDF)November 2018 Gaza–Israel ClashesHamas Military Wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt)Qing Dynasty Forces (Xiang and Hunan Armies)Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt)Hui Muslim Rebels and Allied Nian Forces
Personnel
7x Militant PersonnelConfirmed
Undetermined Number of Civilian CasualtiesUnverified
180,000+ PersonnelEstimated
1,500,000+ PersonnelEstimated
Artillery
85x Field GunsUnverified
240x Field GunsUnverified
Other
1x OfficerConfirmed
Iron Dome Missile Stock ExpenditureEstimated
Intelligence Security Breach from Failed Covert OperationIntelligence Report
Domestic Political Confidence Loss and Government PressureEstimated
Unknown Quantity of Weapon Depots and Rocket LaunchersEstimated
Several Command-Control Infrastructure PointsIntelligence Report
12x Supply ConvoysIntelligence Report
8x Command HQsClaimed
47x Supply DepotsIntelligence Report
31x Command HQsConfirmed

Tactical Inventory / Weapons

November 2018 Gaza–Israel ClashesDungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt)
Armor / Vehicles

Israel Defense Forces (IDF)

  • Merkava Mk4 Main Battle Tank

Hamas Military Wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Qing Dynasty Forces (Xiang and Hunan Armies)

Hui Muslim Rebels and Allied Nian Forces

Air Power

Israel Defense Forces (IDF)

  • F-16I Sufa Fighter Jet

Hamas Military Wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Qing Dynasty Forces (Xiang and Hunan Armies)

Hui Muslim Rebels and Allied Nian Forces

Artillery / Siege

Israel Defense Forces (IDF)

Hamas Military Wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Qing Dynasty Forces (Xiang and Hunan Armies)

  • Krupp Field Guns

Hui Muslim Rebels and Allied Nian Forces

  • Locally-Forged Cannons
Other

Israel Defense Forces (IDF)

  • Iron Dome Air Defense System
  • AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter
  • Drone / UAV Intelligence Platform

Hamas Military Wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

  • Qassam Rocket
  • Iranian-made Fajr-5 Rocket
  • Grad-type Multiple Rocket Launchers
  • Mortar
  • Tunnel Infrastructure and Underground Logistics Network

Qing Dynasty Forces (Xiang and Hunan Armies)

  • Mauser Rifles
  • Rifled Muskets
  • Tuntian Supply Colony System

Hui Muslim Rebels and Allied Nian Forces

  • Jezail Muskets
  • Fortress Defense Networks
  • Cavalry Detachments

Staff Analysis

November 2018 Gaza–Israel Clashes
Dungan Revolt (Tongzhi Hui Revolt)

Hamas responded to IDF action with rapid multi-axis rocket fire through a distributed launch network doctrine rather than static defensive positions, continuously outpacing IDF targeting cycles. The IDF demonstrated its own form of doctrinal flexibility by prioritizing air power over ground forces in response to shifting operational conditions.

Qing forces transitioned flexibly between classical siege warfare and irregular operations; Hui rebels, locked in static fortress defense, demonstrated no doctrinal flexibility.

Delaying/Deterrence Action — Both sides operated with limited objectives; the IDF managed the 'obligation to respond' narrative through airstrikes following the operational compromise, while Hamas sought to accelerate international mediation through sustained rocket fire and secure a ceasefire on favorable terms.

War of Annihilation — Zuo Zongtang's doctrine of 'first cleanse Shaanxi, then besiege Gansu, finally reconquer Xinjiang' constituted a systematic elimination campaign aimed at the physical destruction of Hui military presence.

The IDF identified Hamas weapons depots and rocket launch sites as the center of gravity and directed airstrikes accordingly; however, the failure to reach the intended target of the covert operation demonstrated that the Schwerpunkt was correctly identified but not successfully executed. Hamas's center of gravity was generating enough rocket-fire pressure to force diplomatic intervention before IDF operations could achieve decisive effect.

The Qing side correctly identified the center of gravity of the Hui revolt: the Jinjibao fortress and Ma Hualong's charismatic leadership. The destruction of this center unraveled the entire insurgent network.

The IDF's Khan Yunis covert operation was itself a military deception attempt; however, its exposure eliminated the entire tactical surprise advantage. Hamas's counter-intelligence success reversed the IDF's surprise advantage and allowed Hamas to seize operational initiative.

Zuo created fragmentation within rebel ranks through amnesty offers; some Hui leaders betrayed their comrades, contributing to the success of deception operations.

Hamas's simultaneous multi-axis rocket fire created widespread psychological shock across Israeli civilian infrastructure and imposed a high interception burden on Iron Dome. IDF F-16 precision airstrikes applied targeted firepower against Hamas command-and-control infrastructure throughout the engagement.

Zuo Zongtang's Krupp artillery systematically demolished rebel fortress walls, generating both physical and psychological shock; firepower synchronized with maneuver delivered decisive results.

November's short nights theoretically favored IDF covert operations, but Gaza's dense urban labyrinth and Hamas's intimate knowledge of the terrain negated this advantage. Gaza's narrow and heavily populated geography functioned as a political and operational constraint on IDF firepower.

The rugged topography of the Loess Plateau and the harsh northwestern winters initially favored the rebels, but Zuo's seasonal campaign planning gradually neutralized this natural shield.

The IDF's covert operation being compromised at the critical moment of execution demonstrates a failure to fully 'know the enemy and know oneself' in this specific context. Hamas displayed a superior understanding of IDF operational patterns and successfully deployed counter-measures in time.

Qing forces detected rebel movements in advance through regional Han militia networks, while Hui leaders belatedly recognized Qing force concentrations and lost initiative.

The IDF achieved rapid targeting and strike cycles through air superiority but kept ground maneuver elements deliberately constrained. Hamas applied an interior-line maneuver doctrine by using its tunnel network for rapid repositioning, continuously outpacing IDF targeting cycles.

Qing forces deliberately advanced slowly, consolidating each region before moving to the next; this 'stone upon stone' approach incrementally negated rebel maneuver advantages.

Hamas and PIJ personnel motivated by 'territorial defense and resistance' ideology translated Clausewitzian friction into a tangible force multiplier. The loss of an IDF officer and the operational failure induced a temporary psychological setback within Israeli domestic opinion and political circles.

Hui religious fervor was initially high, but the fall of Jinjibao and execution of Ma Hualong triggered moral collapse; on the Qing side, the restoration of dynastic authority provided high motivation.

Hamas successfully compelled the IDF into diplomatic negotiations through intensive rocket fire without achieving a conventional battlefield victory—an asymmetric application of Sun Tzu's principle of winning without direct decisive engagement. The IDF sought a diplomatic exit following the failed covert operation.

Zuo Zongtang dissolved the rebel front from within by promising amnesty and resettlement to surrendering Hui communities, achieving battlefield-free gains through psychological warfare.

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