Polish–Lithuanian–Teutonic War (Great War) vs Hunger War (1414)

The Polish-Lithuanian side demonstrated doctrinal flexibility by pivoting east rather than forcing the Drewenz defense; the Teutons could not break from their static castle-river defensive doctrine and lost the war of maneuver.

The Polish-Lithuanian command showed flexibility by abandoning the search for open battle and shifting to a siege-less raiding campaign; the Order could not break out of rigid castle-defense doctrine, ceding initiative entirely.

War of Annihilation — At Grunwald, nearly the entire Teutonic command staff and elite knight corps were physically destroyed.

Attrition War — A classic attritional campaign waged through scorched earth and economic devastation, with open battle deliberately avoided.

The Polish-Lithuanian command correctly directed the center of gravity not at Marienburg but at the Teutonic field army; von Jungingen held his center of gravity at Schwetz, deploying to the wrong sector.

The Polish side correctly identified the Order's center of gravity in main castles like Marienburg but failed to strike it; the Order correctly shifted its defensive center of gravity to Culmerland.

Border raids, false axes, and concealment of the assembly point constituted a classical deception operation; the Teutons were locked into the dual-attack scenario and fell victim to military deception.

Küchmeister's scorched earth decision was less tactical deception than strategic resignation; the Polish side converted Sigismund's mediation into a tool of diplomatic pressure, gaining the upper hand in this domain.

The initial charge of Teutonic heavy cavalry pushed back the Lithuanian line, but the flanking intervention of Polish heavy cavalry and the return maneuver of Tatar light cavalry reversed the shock balance.

Firepower and heavy shock elements were not decisive in the Hunger War; the campaign was waged directly through economic destruction and psychological pressure.

The forested and lightly undulating terrain between the villages of Grunwald, Tannenberg, and Łodwigowo constrained the shock charge of Teutonic heavy cavalry; July heat and prolonged marching wore down the Order's armored force.

The forest-marsh character of Prussia favored the defender via castle-centric advantage; however, the post-scorched-earth famine and plague turned 'the earth' into an enemy for both sides.

Through border raids and false axis maneuvers, the Polish-Lithuanian side misled the Teutons on the concentration point; von Jungingen recognized the unified Polish-Lithuanian operation far too late.

Jogaila correctly anticipated Küchmeister's avoidance of open battle and calibrated operational tempo accordingly; the Order was slow to read the Polish diplomatic maneuver.

Polish-Lithuanian forces completed the 80 km transit from the Czerwinsk assembly point to the Prussian border in approximately one week, generating an interior lines advantage; the Teutons were forced into parallel pursuit.

Polish-Lithuanian forces seized initiative through rapid movement via Osterode toward Warmia; however, refusal to commit to castle sieges prevented conversion of maneuver speed into strategic gain.

The legitimacy provided by the Samogitian uprising and the leadership of Jogaila-Vytautas elevated coalition morale; von Jungingen's rage over the Gilgenburg sack led to emotional decision-making.

The psychological dividend of Grunwald sustained high combat spirit on the Polish side; the Teutonic Knights retreated into the passive-defense psychology of locking themselves into castles.

The Polish-Lithuanian side overcame diplomatic traps such as Wenceslaus's mediation and Sigismund's offer of a crown to Vytautas, preserving the integrity of the Ostrów Agreement; despite spending 360,000 florins/ducats, the Teutons could not fracture the alliance.

The Polish side converted the Teutonic battle-avoidance strategy into diplomatic pressure, escalating the dispute to the Council of Constance via Papal Legate William of Lausanne — a textbook application of Sun Tzu's principle of disrupting the enemy's plans.